The empirical evidence on the impact of EU structural funds on economic growth and the economic convergence process has provided mixed, if not to say, contradictory results. There are many reasons for this, among others, the low quality of structural funds data at the regional level and a number of methodological problems.
Introduction
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More than one third of total EU's budget is spent on so-called Cohesion Policy via the structural funds. Its main purpose is to reduce disparities between the development levels and to foster regional convergence.
Investigating the impact of European structural funds on the economic growth and convergence process is an intense research topic. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence, so far, has provided mixed, if not to say, contradictory results. While some authors do find evidence of a positive impact of structural funds on economic growth (Eggert, von Ehrlich, Fenge, and König (2007) ; Bouvet (2005) ; Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg, and Verspagen (2003) ), others find weak (Percoco (2005) ; Bussoletti and Esposti (2004) ) or even no impact (e.g., Dall'erba and Le Gallo (2007) ; De Freitag, Pereira, and Torres (2003) ; Garcia-Milá and McGuire (2001) ). There are many reasons for these mixed results, among others, the low quality of structural funds data at the regional level and a number of methodological problems.
Against this background, this paper addresses these issues by using a new panel dataset of 130 NUTS-1 / NUTS-2 regions over the time period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . We extend the current literature with regard to at least two aspects:
First of all, we extend the time period of investigation by several years using data of the last Financial Perspective 2000-2006 that has not been analysed before. Moreover, we use more precise measures of structural funds by distinguishing between payments and commitments. Secondly, we examine the robustness of our results by comparing different econometric approaches highlighting specific methodological problems. We apply, inter alia, spatial econometric techniques and a continuous treatment effects model. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on the impact of structural funds on economic growth and the economic convergence process, respectively. Section 3 describes the dataset used in this paper. Subsequently, section 4 discusses the econometric challenges, before section 5 contains the econometric analysis. Finally, section 6 concludes.
Literature review
This section briefly reviews the literature on the impact of structural funds on economic growth and convergence, respectively. While some papers investigate this research question using country data (e.g., Bähr (2008) ; Ederveen, de Groot, and Nahuis (2006) ; Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005) ), we focus on papers using regional data. The main results of this survey are summarised in Table 2 . Generally, the literature review does not allow for clear-cut results. First of all, some authors find empirical evidence for a positive impact of European structural funds. These conclusions are based on a European sample like in Bussoletti and Esposti (2004) , Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg, and Verspagen (2003) and Bouvet (2005) (EU-8)) as well as for smaller samples like in Eggert, von Ehrlich, Fenge, and König (2007) (Germany) or Antunes and Soukiazis (2005) (Portugal) . Furthermore, some authors do not find a statistically significant impact of structural funds on the regional growth rates (Garcia-Milá and McGuire (2001) ; Dall'erba and Le Gallo (2007) ). Moreover, in some cases the findings are conditioned on certain aspects. Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) , e.g., find that only structural fund expenditures for education and investment have a positive effect in the medium run, whereas expenditures for agriculture do not. In Ederveen, Gorter, de Mooij, and Nahuis (2002) , the conclusions depend on the assumptions of the convergence model. Assuming that all regions finally catch up to the same level, they find positive evidence. By contrast, assuming that the convergence process is limited to convergence within countries, they do not find empirical evidence. Finally, Puigcerver-Penalver (2004) 
Variables and data
Unfortunately, data availability at the European regional level is limited with regard to both structural funds data and economic variables. Consequently, the choice of the time period of investigation and the choice of regions are pre-determined by the availability of suitable data.
The annual reports on structural funds published by the European Commission (1995, 1996a,b, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007b) only contain regional commitments / payments for the period 1994-1999. To be more precise, the annual reports include detailed allocations of the structural funds at the regional level for the years 1997 (European Commission (1998 , 2000 ) and some less detailed information for the years 1995 (European Commission (1996a , 1997 ). Since 2000, the annual reports only contain data at the country level. However, the annual regional payments and commitments were made available by the European Commission in Brussels for the time period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . This data has, to the best of our knowledge, not yet been analysed before. By using this data it has to be taken into account that only information on the period 2000-2006 are available excluding payments / commitments from the previous Financial Perspective 1994-1999. In order to avoid an under-estimation of the total amount of European structural funds, we had to allocate those payments from the Financial Perspective 1994-1999 that have not been paid out by 1999. To do so, we calculated the residual amount of structural funds by subtracting the aggregated payments 1994-1999 from the aggregated commitments [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] . Assuming that all commitments finally lead to payments and taking into account the N+2 rule basically stating that payments can be called up two years after they are allocated as commitments, we allocated the remaining amount at a rate of 2:1 to the years 2000 and 2001, respectively.
In our analysis we concentrate on objective 1 and objective 2 payments for two reasons. First of all, they comprise the main part (85 %) of total structural funds. Secondly, it is possible to allocate them directly to the regional level. By contrast, objective 3 payments are frequently allocated to the national level. As objectives 1 and 2 each consisted of 2 objectives in the Financial Perspective 1994-1999, we added the objective 6 payments to objective 1 and the objective 5b payments to objective 2. Moreover, we only used structural funds data that we were able to allocate to the regional level.
Therefore, multi-regional programmes for the national level (e.g., structural funds expenditures for education) were not considered. As a consequence, we could extend the period of investigation to the time after 2000.
Concerning the economic data we used the Regio database by Eurostat.
Due to recent modification in the accounting standards (from the European System of Accounting (ESA) 1979 to ESA 1995), most variables are only available for the period 1995 (ESA 1995 .
For the spatial econometrics analysis, we used the Gisco Eurostat dataset containing spherical coordinates measured in latitudes and longitudes of the European Union and the candidate countries (see Eurostat (2007) ). We adjusted the data according to the selection of our dataset comprising 130 NUTS-1 and NUTS-2 regions. As mentioned above, the selection of NUTS regions is predetermined by the allocation of structural funds. For a detailed description of the choice of the NUTS level, see the Appendix, section A. All variables are listed in Table 1 in the appendix.
Econometric challenges
When estimating the effects of structural fund payments on economic growth or other outcome variables at the regional level several methodological challenges have to be considered.
First of all, there is the danger of a biased estimate due to reverse causality. The allocation criteria of the structural funds are likely to be correlated with the dependent variable "economic growth". First and foremost, the allocation of structural funds is based on the ratio of regional GDP (in PPP) and the EU-wide GDP. If this ratio is below 75 per cent, the region is a socalled "objective 1" region implying that this region is eligible to the highest transfers relative to GDP. Furthermore, allocation depends, inter alia, on regional unemployment rate, employment structure, and population density.
The effective payments by the Commission to the regions depend on the regions' abilities to initiate and co-finance projects. This ability may be higher in times of plentiful tax revenues. Second, there may be endogeneity of the structural funds, i.e., there may be unobserved variables simultaneously affecting structural fund payments and growth. If these are constant over time they may be eliminated by fixed-effects or by taking first differences. If these unobserved variables are not constant, methods such as instrumental variable (IV) estimators are necessary. Third, there may be regional spillover effects. For example, structural fund payments may increase one region's growth which, in turn, may affect neighbouring regions' growth rates positively. If these spillover effects cannot be separated from the "original" impulse, the estimated effect of structural fund payments might be biased.
Fourth, although growth theory provides well-established suggestions for the estimation of growth relationships (see among others, Islam (1995); Durlauf and Quah (1999) ), it is ex ante unclear which functional form is adequate for the effect of structural funds. In particular, there may be non-linearites and interactions with covariates, which may lead to biased estimates if they are not taken into account.
In order to deal with the first and the second problem, an IV estimator combined with fixed-effects or first-differences seems to be the right choice.
However, there is no reasonable external IV available. Hence, identification will be based on internal IV via a system GMM estimator. The third problem is approached by applying a spatial regression model, where we use a weighting matrix containing information on the k-nearest neighbours of each region in order to remove spatial autocorrelation as recently proposed inter alia by by Anselin, Florax, and Rey (2004) . Finally, in order to avoid simple functional form assumptions to a large extent, structural fund payments are interpreted as a continuous treatment and the method of generalised propensity score (GPS) as proposed by Hirano and Imbens (2004) is applied here.
The GPS method assumes exogeneity of structural fund payments, that is, conditional on covariates (observable characteristics of the regions) the level of treatment (structural fund payments) can be considered as random. The method leads to the estimation of a dose response function, representing the response (growth rate) which is associated with different values of the continuous dose (structural fund payments).
Apparently, given the available data, we are not able to deal with all problems mentioned above simultaneously. However, by applying different methods, we hope to get a general idea about the methodological problems and the range of the true effect of structural fund payments on growth.
Empirical analyses
This section presents the econometric analysis of the paper by using a new panel dataset for the time period 1995-2005 and by addressing some of the methodological challenges discussed above. Beginning with the "classical" regression approaches (OLS, FE, GMM) in section 5.1, the influence of spatial autocorrelation is investigated in section 5.2, before section 5.3 contains the results of the method of generalised propensity score.
"Classical" panel regression model approaches
Derived from a neoclassical Solow-type growth model (Solow (1956) ) and similar to the empirical operationalisation by of Mankiw, Romer, and Weill (1992) and Ederveen, de Groot, and Nahuis (2006) , we estimate the following growth model:
where the subscripts i = 1, . is the error term of our specification.
Unfortunately, data availability of our explanatory variables is limited at the regional level. Especially, there are, to the best of our knowledge, no high-quality education data like those proposed at the country level by
De La Fuente and Doménech (2006), Barro and Lee (2001) or Cohen and Soto (2007) . Hence, we have to assume that our innovation variable (number of patents per inhabitant) serves as a proxy for education. Furthermore, it might measure the technological progress in region i.
In order to increase the robustness of our results and due to the great influence of the estimation procedure, we estimated our model with various econometric approaches. We always started with the dynamic specification listed in equation (1). If the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of our regression (g i,t−1 ) is not statistically significant at the 10% level,
we estimated a static version of equation (1) by excluding g i,t−1 from the estimation.
The regression results are listed in Table 3 . They are consistent with the predictions of the neoclassical growth theory. We find -independently of the empirical estimation approach -that the initial GDP (in PPP) variable is strongly significant. In empirical investigations for longer time periods (e.g., cross-section estimations for 20-100 years like in Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004) or for several 5-year averages like in Ederveen, de Groot, and Nahuis (2006)) this variable gives evidence for the conditional beta convergence, i.e., controlled for other explanatory variables, poorer regions catch up to richer regions. Note that from theoretical considerations this is only valid for more or less similar economies on their convergence pathes. This condition might be fulfilled as our sample consists of Western European regions. However, the time period of consideration is too short to derive solid predictions about the convergence process. Nevertheless, the initial GDP is an important control variable in our panel. The gross fixed capital variable is positive throughout the estimation approaches and it is statistically highly significant. The proxy for education and/or technological progress (innov) is positive and thus shows the expected sign derived from theory. However, it is only significant in the system GMM specification (columns (7) and (8) of Table 3 ).
Finally, the population growth rate shows in accordance with the predictions of the Solow model (with the exception of the system GMM specifications) a negative sign. However, it is never statistically significant. The key variable of interest, however, is the structural funds variable.
Beginning with a fixed effects approach with Huber-White robust standard errors (column (1) of Table 3 ), we find a positive and significant impact of structural funds on economic growth. The results have to be interpreted with caution, as Nickell (1981) showed that the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator yields biased results in the case of a dynamic specification approach. This result was recently confirmed by Monte Carlo simulations of Judson and Owen (1999) showing that even in fairly long panels with T = 20, the bias can be as large as 20 per cent. Having a closer look at the results of the LSDV specification in column (1) we see that a dynamic approach is not necessary, as the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable is far from being statistically significant. Hence, we re-run the regression in a static approach (see column (2)) which has the advantage of being more parsimonious and, in addition, not being Nickell-biased. The coefficient of the structural fund variable is slightly increased and it is still highly statistically significant.
The fixed effect approach assumes that all explanatory variables are strictly exogenous and that the error term does not show serial correlation.
The latter assumption is checked with the Wooldrige Test of first-order autocorrelation (Wooldridge (2002) specified to be robust not only to heteroskedasticity but also to first-order autocorrelation using the estimator proposed by Newey and West (1987) . The results displayed in column (3) show that the significance levels are hardly changed. Similar to the LSDV estimator, a dynamic approach is not necessary so that we estimate the Newey-West specification in a static approach (see column (4)). Thus, the standard errors are slightly decreased keeping the significance levels of the explanatory variables unchanged.
Moreover, we repeated the analysis using standard errors that are robust to general forms of spatial dependence. Our set of regions is a non-random sample which could be subject to common influences affecting our variables of interest. Thus, we estimate standard errors employing a nonparametric covariance matrix estimation procedure as proposed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) (for a recent discussion see Hoechle (2007) ). The specification results in columns (5) (dynamic approach) and (6) (static) again strengthen our previous findings. The coefficients of the structural fund variable are statistically significant, the standard errors are slightly higher than in the previous regressions.
Finally, as discussed in section 4 our results might be biased due to endogeneity of the explanatory variables. In order to solve this problem, we estimate equation (1) using the System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) . In column (7), the model is estimated assuming that the GDP, the structural funds and the population growth rate are endogenous while only the time dummies, the gross fixed capital and the number of patents per inhabitants are assumed to be exogenous. Due to missing reliable external instruments, all endogenous variables are instrumented by their own lags. In order not to violate the assumption that the number of instruments must not exceed the number of groups in our estimation, we used the third and fourth lag of the endogenous variables as instruments. (8) show that the structural fund variable is still highly significant and the coefficient is only slightly reduced compared to the previous specification in (7).
Spatial analysis
The results of our "classical" panel regression approaches might be biased, because we neglected any sort of spatial correlation. However, one might assume that some part of our significant results are explained by regional spillover effects. Moreover, in our sample of 130 Western European regions, those regions which are located next to each other might show stronger spatial dependence than regions which are far off.
In order to take into account these considerations we apply spatial econometrics techniques, where the key task is to specify a weighting matrix W containing information about the connectivity between regions. This square matrix has N rows / columns corresponding to the 130 regions of our sample.
Its diagonal consists of zeros whereas each w ij specifies the way region i is spatially connected to region j. To standardise the outside influence upon each region, the weighting matrix is normalised such that the elements sum up to one. In this paper we follow Le Gallo and Ertur (2003) and Ertur and Koch (2006) by using a weighting matrix consisting of the k-nearest neighbours computed from the great circle distance between region centroids.
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Generally, the k-nearest neighbours weighting matrix W (k) is defined as follows: 
The definition and the selection of the variables remain the same as above.
Apart from the integration of the spatial weighting matrix, the only difference to equation 1 is that we concentrate on a cross-section analysis.
To start with, explorative evidence for the existence of spatial correlation is given in Figure 1 showing After this explorative evidence we shed more lights on the impact of regional correlation by running two cross-section regressions with our 130 regions. The results are displayed in Table 4 . Column (1) displays the OLS regression results ignoring any spatial effects. Similarly to the "classical" panel regression results discussed above, the signs of the coefficients are mainly in line with the predictions of the neoclassical growth model. Focussing on the structural fund variable we see that it is positive and statistically significant at a 5% level. One frequently used indicator for the detection of spatial correlation is Moran's I. Table 4 shows that Moran's I is positive and strongly significant which is a first hint that spatial correlation is present. Another way of illustrating that our results are influenced by a regional pattern is displayed in Figure 5 showing a standard deviational map for the residuals of the OLS regression. It shows that similarly coloured areas are in similar locations which indicates a positive spatial correlation. Furthermore, it shows a tendency to overpredict negative residuals and to underpredict positive residuals, suggesting the possible presence of spatial heterogeneity in the form of spatial regimes.
Figure 5 goes here.
After having found empirical evidence for spatial autocorrelation, the choice between the spatial-lag versus the spatial-error approach has to be made. We follow the test procedure proposed by Anselin (1988) and Anselin, Bera, Florax, and Yoon (1996) stating that this decision should be made by comparing the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics of the spatial-lag and the spatial-error model. Table 4 shows that both test statistics, the LM-error (p-value = 0.0000) and the LM-lag (p-value = 0.0000) test statistic, clearly reject the null hypothesis of no spatial correlation. As a consequence, the choice was made on the basis of the robust versions of the LM tests. Here, the results clearly indicate to use a spatial lag model (the LM test statistic is only significant for the robust spatial lag version (p-value 0.0000)).
Therefore, we estimate the model according to the spatial lag model presented in equation (2) with a Maximum Likelihood approach. The results are displayed in column (2) of Table 4 . The estimated spatial autoregressive coefficient is equal to 0.49, which is highly significant (p-value = 0.0000).
Compared to the OLS regression results presented above all coefficients are slightly decreased. To some extent, the explanatory power of these variables that was attributed to their in-region value, is really due to the neighboring locations, which is now picked up by the coefficient of the spatially lagged dependent variable. The signs of the coefficients remain the same. Focussing on our key variable of interest, the structural funds, the coefficient shrinks from 10.34 (OLS) to 9.24 (ML spatial lag). Nevertheless, it remains significant in both cases with p-values of 0.0165 (OLS) to 0.0139 (ML spatial lag).
The improvement of fit for the spatial lag specification is shown by comparing the Log-Likelihood and the information criteria of the OLS and the ML spatial lag estimation. Table 4 shows that the Log-Likelihood increases from the OLS (83.1) to the ML spatial lag specification (94.1), whereas both the Schwarz Criterium (SC) and the Akaike Information Criterium (AIC) decrease compared to the OLS specification.
Summing up, the results of this section indicate to include spatial effects into the regression model. Nevertheless, the results are hardly affected: We still find empirical evidence that the structural funds have a positive and significant impact on economic growth.
Implementation of the method of Generalised Propensity Score
In the following, we interpret structural fund payments as a continuous treatment and use the method of Generalised Propensity Score. The method leads to the estimation of a Dose Response function, representing the response (GDP growth rate) which is associated with different values of the continuous dose (structural fund payments per GDP). In the following, the terms continuous "treatment" and "dose" can be used synonymously.
Here, we do not describe the GPS method in detail as we closely follow Hirano and Imbens (2004) . 
with Y (f ) denoting the outcome associated with the treatment level (dose)
f . Equation (3) states that, conditional on the covariates, the level of treatment (dose) received by a region is independent of the potential outcome Y (f ). This is also called exogeneity or selection on observables.
The GPS is defined as follows: If r(f, x) is the conditional density of the treatment given the covariates f F |X (f |x), then the GPS is defined as R = r(F, X).
If the assignment to treatment is weakly unconfounded, Hirano and Imbens (2004) show that adjusting for the GPS eliminates the bias associated with differences in X. Hence, it is not necessary to condition directly on X when estimating Y (f ). An important feature of the GPS is the so-called balancing property: The GPS "balances" the covariates within strata defined by the values of the GPS, such that, within strata the probability that F = f does not depend on the value of X (Flores-Lagunes, Gonzalez, and Neuman (2007)). Finally, using the estimated GPS, a dose-response function representing the average potential outcome E[Y (f )] over the whole range of the dose can be estimated.
In concrete terms, the method is implemented as described in Hirano and Imbens (2004) with the following three step procedure:
1. We estimate the GPS by OLS: Let i denote one of N regions. We use a normal distribution for the treatment conditional on the covariates
). The estimated GPS is calculated aŝ
2. The conditional expectation of Y i given F i and R i is modelled as a flexible function. Here, we follow Kluve et al. (2007) and use the following specification and estimate these parameters by OLS:
3. Finally, the average potential outcome at treatment level f is estimated
The entire 
Following Hirano and Imbens (2004) the associated standard errors are bootstrapped in order to account for the generated regressor problem. Moodie and Stephens (2007) extend the GPS method to longitudinal data. Fryges and Wagner (2007) apply the GPS method to a panel of firms in order to evaluate the effect of export intensity on productivity growth simply by including time dummies into the conditioning set X of the GPS.
We follow this approach. Concretely, we explain the response of real growth from t − 1 to t + 2 to the dose of structural funds payments per GDP in t, The results are similar and are available upon request.
outcome variable. The question is whether conditional on X exogeneity of the treatment can be assumed. In our application, the conditioning set is limited by data availability. Nevertheless, we have important variables capturing the allocation criteria of the funds as well as regions' ability to initiate and co-finance projects. We condition on the levels of the outcome variable (real GDP per capita in PPP) prior to the treatment (t − 1 up to t − 3)
in order to balance pre-treatment differences in the regions' initial position. Table 7 . In all cases the t-statistics are significantly reduced.
Only for the unemployment rate, the proportion of long-term unemployed as well as the population density the t-statistics indicate statistically significant coefficients. However, most importantly, the outcome variable "real GDP per capita in PPP" seems to be perfectly balanced prior to the treatment, which can be interpreted as a kind of pre-program Test (Heckman and Hotz (1989) ). Table 7 goes here.
Estimating the Dose Response Function
As noted above the outcome variable is three year growth of real GDP (PPP)
per capita (in percent) which is explained by the ratio of structural funds payments to GDP (in percent). The estimation results of the second step (equation 6) are shown in Table 7 Put differently, with regard to economic growth it does not matter which "dose" of structural payments a region receives. The shape of the confidence intervals can be explained by the fact that the number of observations is reduced with increasing dose. For example, 50 percent of the regions receive less that 0.12 percent structural fund payments per GDP.
Conclusion
The intention of this paper is to evaluate the growth effects of structural fund payments at the regional level. We extend the current literature with regard to at least two aspects: First of all, we extend the time period of investigation by several years using data of the last Financial Perspective 2000-2006 that has not been analysed before. Moreover, we use more precise measures of structural funds by using payments, while most of the previous literature is based on commitments. Secondly, we examine the robustness of our results by comparing different econometric approaches highlighting specific methodological problems. We apply "classical" panel regression models like system GMM, spatial econometric techniques and a continuous treatment effects model.
Within the framework of the "classical" panel regression approaches, the simple fixed effects model and the system GMM specification, and in the spatial regression model we find empirical evidence of a positive effect of structural fund payments on growth. However, the results are not clear-cut as the continuous treatment effects model cannot detect any positive effect.
The forthcoming version of this paper will include:
• also structural fund payments under the other objective 3
• the results of a panel spatial regression model Sweden. However, there are some countries where we had to use NUTS-1 due to the following reasons: First of all, not in all countries the EU regional funds flow to the NUTS-2 level. In Germany, the EU support benefits the NUTS-1 regions. Secondly, in some countries, there is no clear-cut separation in the sense that the structural funds are either paid to the NUTS-1 or to the NUTS-2 level. Thirdly, the annual reports of structural funds for 1995 (European Commission (1996b , 1997 ) for some countries only contain data at NUTS-1 level. Consequently, we chose the NUTS-1 level for Austria, Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
For Denmark and Luxembourg there exist no subdivisions so that NUTS-0, NUTS-1 and NUTS-2 codes are the same. We regard those cases as NUTS-2 regions. In Ireland the labels of NUTS-0 and NUTS-1 level are identical so we classify Ireland as a NUTS-1 region.
As we are mainly interested in spatial spillover effects, we did not consider the overseas regions of France (Départments d'outre-mer (fr9) consisting of Gudeloupe (fr91), Martinique (fr92), Guyane (fr93) and Réunion (fr94)), Portugal (Regiao Autonoma dos Acores (pt2, pt20), Regiao Autonoma da
Luxembourg ( 1994-1999 (2000-2004) on (2007) average growth.
(Germany) total SF of 1989 SF of -1993 SF of (1994 Solid line: estimated conditional expectation of regions' GDP growth rate from t − 1 to t + 3 given the structural funds payments in t and the estimated generalised propensity score (GPS). Source: Own illustration. 
